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Abstract:  Examining the relationship between jealous behaviour and the amygdala may be 
quite informative about the function of the amygdala, but the amygdala may be less helpful in 
informing us about jealous behaviour. Claims about the potential practical relevance of the 
results also require that the magnitude of the effects inform the relevant discussion. The dogs 
used in the study probably share some very important personality characteristics; this too 
limits the practical implications of Cook et al.’s findings for dogs in general. It is nevertheless a 
testament to the skill of the experimenters, and the amazing bond between dogs and humans, 
that such research could be conducted at all.  
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It is a remarkable feat to have trained 13 dogs to tolerate an fMRI scanner, let alone get them 
to cooperate in an experiment in such a context. One cannot help but be deeply impressed by 
the experimental virtuosity of the researchers (Cook et al., 2018). However, I am certainly not 
the first to be uneasy about the real utility of much neuroscience research: There is something 
of a backlash against many of the claims of neuroscience (Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013), a backlash 
so well established that there is a backlash against the backlash (Marcus, 2013). At a broad 
philosophical level, my concern with the target article is that it is implicit in the title that we 
can take jealousy in dogs more seriously because of evidence from neuroscience. However, it 
is an uncomfortable truth for some scientists studying emotion that the primary data for our 
knowledge about emotions are subjective experience and human judgement. The plural of 
anecdote in this case is data. Our knowledge of the localisation of affect is ultimately derived 
from human experience and judgement. We think a particular area of the brain may be 
associated with a particular emotion because we have induced a particular emotion and then 
observed what the brain gets up to. We know what emotions are because we are emotional 
beings. We began investigating jealousy in dogs because our experience with dogs suggested 
that dogs were jealous. We did not start to investigate jealousy in dogs because of what was 
going on in their amygdala. Studying brain/behaviour relationships provides a rich source of 
information concerning brain function, but much less so concerning behaviour.  
 There are several more technical issues that I would like to mention. I am not at all sure 
that amygdala function can provide really useful information. The amygdala is implicated in 
just about everything from emotion, to fundamental cognitive processes such as long-term 
memory, working memory and visual attention (Schaefer & Gray, 2007). The statistical analysis 
is also problematic, as interpreting the magnitude of effects from a mixed-effects model is by 
Animal Sentience 2018.132:  Morris on Cook et al. on Dog Jealousy 
 2 
no means straightforward. In the discussion, the authors make no mention of the magnitude 
of the effects, but simply state that there was a positive correlation between aggressive 
temperament and amygdala activation. The magnitude of any such relationship is crucial to 
any claims that the information from the study could inform behavioural interventions.  
 My final comment is that regardless of the C-BARQ scores, given what the dogs were 
required to do, I cannot think that these dogs were anything but highly social, unaggressive 
and co-operative. These may be special dogs. In any study of individual differences, it is crucial 
to have sampled the range of the trait of interest. The findings of a study of individual 
differences using 13 very carefully trained and selected participants must be treated with 
great caution. 
 My overwhelming feeling having written this commentary is social guilt (which I believe 
is thought to be localised to the anterior middle cingulate cortex) because being a critic is easy, 
and I remain amazed that the researchers managed to conduct this study at all. 
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